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It is understandable […] that the philosopher should seek a transcendental vantage point, 
outside the world that imprisons [the] natural scientist and mathematician. He would make 
himself independent of the conceptual scheme which it is his task to study and revise. “Give 
me πoυ στω [a place to stand]”, Archimedes said, “and I will move the world.” However, 
there is no such cosmic exile. […] The philosopher is in the position rather, as Neurath says, 
“of a mariner who must rebuild his ship on the open sea”. 
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This book is the result of almost nine years of thinking and writing about Quine’s naturalism. 
The project started with a term paper on the Carnap-Quine debate for Jeanne Peijnenburg’s 
inspiring course on the history of analytic philosophy in 2008 and gradually evolved into a 
dissertation about the relation between holism and naturalism in Quine’s philosophy, which I 
defended in Groningen in 2015. Encouraged by the warm support of my colleagues and a 
number of fellow Quine scholars, I spent the last two years revising and extending the 
manuscript. Having acquired a serious case of ‘archive fever’, a significant chunk of this 
period was spent at the W. V. Quine Papers at Houghton Library, Harvard University. Using 
his published corpus as well the thousands of letters, notes, draft manuscripts, lectures, grant 
proposals, teaching materials, and annotations collected at the archives, I have aimed to write 
a book that reconstructs both the nature and the development of Quine’s naturalism. The 
notes, letters, and lectures that have most influenced my views about (the development of) 
Quine’s naturalism are transcribed and collected in the appendix.  
Parts of this book have been published elsewhere. I thank the respective journals for 
granting me permission to reprint these papers: 
 
Quine’s Argument from Despair (2014). British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy, 22(1), 150-173. (chapter 2) 
 
Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal-External Distinction (2017). 
Erkenntnis, 82(4), 873-890. (chapter 3) 
 
	 x	
Boarding Neurath’s Boat: The Early Development of Quine’s Naturalism (2017). 
Journal for the History of Philosophy, 55(2), 317-342. (sections 4.1-4.2, 6.2, and 6.6) 
 
Quine on the Nature of Naturalism (2017). The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 
55(1), 96-115. (section 4.5) 
 
Sign and Object: Quine’s Forgotten Philosophical Book Project (forthcoming). 
Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1693-z. (chapter 5) 
 
Quine’s ‘Needlessly Strong’ Holism (2017). Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science, Part A, 61(1), 11-20. (sections 6.8-6.11) 
 
Setting Sail: The Development and Reception of Quine’s Naturalism (forthcoming). 
Philosophers’ Imprint. (chapter 7) 
 
Still, this book aims to be more than a collection of papers. Many sections have been revised, 
extended, and rewritten for the purposes of this book. Moreover, an introductory chapter, a 
conclusion, several new sections (i.e. 4.3-4.4; 4.6-4.8; 5.5; 6.3-6.5; 6.7), and seven 
appendices have been included to fill the gaps and to present a comprehensive account of 
Quine’s naturalism. 
Much of this research has been funded by The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific 
Research (grants 322-20-001 and 275-20-064). My research visits to Harvard University, 
Houghton Library, Bethel, CT, and the Harvard University Archives have been funded by a 
Kristeller-Popkin Travel Fellowship from the Journal of the History of Philosophy, a Rodney 
G. Dennis Fellowship in the Study of Manuscripts from Houghton Library, and a Travel 
Bursary from the Evert Willem Beth Foundation. I am very grateful for this financial support.  
 Finally, it is my great pleasure to thank the many people without whom I could not 
have completed this book: Jeanne Peijnenburg, Allard Tamminga, Lieven Decock, Gary 
	 xi	
Ebbs, Hans-Johann Glock, Peter Hylton, Gary Kemp, Fred Muller, Martin Lenz, and two 
anonymous referees for Oxford University Press for their comments on earlier versions of 
this book; Harvard’s Department of Philosophy, Nyasha Borde, Monique Duhaime, Juliet 
Floyd, Warren Goldfarb, Leslie Morris, Mark Richard, Thomas Ricketts, and the staff at 
Houghton Library and the Harvard University Archives for their warm welcome during my 
research visits; Douglas and Maryclaire Quine for welcoming me into their house to examine 
the remaining 57 boxes of unprocessed archive material; Hannah Doyle, Lucy Randall, 
Richard Risomaki, Leslie Johson, and Tharani Ramachandran at Oxford University Press and 
Newgen for smoothly guiding my manuscript through the editing and production process; 
Jody Azzouni, Richard Creath, Fons Dewulf, Dagfinn Føllesdal, James Levine, Eric 
Schliesser, Andrew Smith, Serdal Tumkaya, Thomas Uebel, Wim Vanrie, the members of the 
EPS seminar in Tilburg, the members of the PCCP and the WiP seminars in Groningen, and 
audiences in Amsterdam, Athens, Bloomington, Bologna, Calgary, Chicago, Denver, 
Edinburgh, Groningen, Konstanz, Manchester, Milan, Modena, Munich, Rotterdam, Tampa, 
Tilburg, and Zürich for their comments on various papers and chapters in various stages; 
Reto Gubelmann, Frederique Janssen-Lauret, Gary Kemp, and Sean Morris for their 
wonderful Quine workshops in Denver, Glasgow, Manchester, and Zürich; and Douglas B. 
Quine (W. V. Quine Literary Estate), and Catherine Z. Elgin (Literary executor for Nelson 
Goodman) for granting me permission to publish some of Quine’s and Goodman’s papers, 
notes, and letters as appendices to this book. Of course, the above individuals do not 
necessarily agree with my conclusions and they are not responsible for any residual errors or 
omissions. 
A note on citation and transcription: Unless specified differently, the unpublished 
documents I refer to in this book are part of the W. V. Quine Papers, collection MS Am 2587, 
Houghton Library, Harvard University. In the main text and in the footnotes, I refer to these 
	 xii	
documents by citing dates (if known) and item numbers. A letter of Quine to the American 
Philosophical Association, for example, could be referred to as (January 1, 1950, item 31). 
For quick reference, the item numbers are listed in the List of Abbreviations (pp. xiii-xxii). 
The items’ full titles and box numbers are provided in the bibliography. In transcribing 
Quine’s autograph notes, drafts, and letters, I have aimed to minimize editorial interference 
and chosen not to correct ungrammatical shorthand. In referring to Quine’s published work, I 
use abbreviations (listed in the List of Abbreviations) as well as the year in which the paper 
or book was first published. If the paper is incorporated in one of Quine’s collections of 
papers, the page numbers will refer to this collection. The first page of “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism”, for example, will be referred to as (TDE, 1951a, 20). The details of Quine’s 
published work cited in this book are provided in the bibliography.  
 In his autobiography, The Time of My Life, Quine argues that science and history of 
science appeal to very different tempers: “An advance in science resolves an obscurity, a 
tangle, a complexity, an inelegance, that the scientist then gratefully dismisses and forgets. 
The historian of science tries to recapture the very tangles, confusions, and obscurities from 
which the scientist is so eager to free himself” (TML, 1985a, 194).  I hope this book 
accomplishes a bit of both; although I will show that Quine faced many tangles, confusions, 
and obscurities in developing his naturalism, I also hope to convey that the system he created 
is one of great clarity and elegance.  
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